Bre-B turns one: results, figures and lessons on identity and fraud in instant payments
- In its first year, Bre-B processed more than 1.7 billion transfers worth over COP 262 trillion (Banco de la República, 6 October 2026).
- 36 million people hold at least one key. Of 116 million registered keys, 45 million have been used to receive at least one payment.
- The number of institutions connected to instant payments rose from around 25 to 245, including more than 172 credit unions.
- The infrastructure has not been breached: Bre-B-related fraud relies on social engineering, bank impersonation and receiving accounts.
- Year two brings higher-value payments, business payments, mandatory Open Finance and Law 2573, in force since 19 November 2026.
In its first year, Bre-B, Colombia’s instant payment system, processed more than 1.7 billion transfers worth over COP 262 trillion, according to the review presented by Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, on 6 October 2026. It is the fastest uptake of instant payments Colombia has ever seen.
Bre-B (in Spanish) showed that the country adopts instant payments at high speed. It also widened the attack surface and became an attractive channel for fraudsters. Here is a look back at what happened in its first year.
“Today we see more and more people finding in Bre-B an easy, fast and secure alternative for sending and receiving money.”
Leonardo Villar, Governor of Banco de la República. Source: Banco de la República, 6 October 2026. Own translation.
Bre-B in numbers: the first year in data
Bre-B closed its first year with more than 1.7 billion transactions, 36 million users and 245 connected institutions.
| Indicator | Figure | Source and date |
| Transfers in the first year | More than 1.7 billion | Banco de la República, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Value moved | More than COP 262 trillion | Banco de la República, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Users with at least one key | More than 36 million | Banco de la República, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Registered keys / keys used to receive a payment | 116 million / 45 million | Banco de la República, Oct 2026 |
| Connected institutions | 245 (around 25 before Bre-B) | Banco de la República, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Transactions below COP 50,000 | 62% | Banco de la República, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Payments per person in the first year | 35.5 (Pix: 44.8) | Banco de la República, via El Tiempo, 6 Oct 2026 |
| Daily record | 10.4 million transactions (1 Oct 2026) | First-year presentation, Banco de la República |
Table 1. Bre-B in numbers, first year. Source: Banco de la República (press release and presentation of 6 October 2026). Data as of 30 September 2026.
The main successes of the first year
Bre-B’s biggest successes lie in adoption, the breadth of its ecosystem and stability: 36 million users, 245 connected institutions and an infrastructure with availability above 99.8%.
Mass adoption and less cash
In 2019, cash was the main everyday payment method for 90% of the population, according to Banco de la República’s survey. In 2026 that figure fell to 66%, according to the central bank’s presentation on Bre-B’s first year (in Spanish).[Verify before publishing: confirm the 66% in the presentation] The growth of instant payments through Bre-B explains much of the shift, together with the expansion of digital accounts.
A broader ecosystem: from 25 to 245 institutions
Before Bre-B, around 25 institutions were connected to instant payment schemes. The first phase started with 128, and by the anniversary there were 245, including more than 172 credit unions and six payment systems.
Bringing in smaller institutions is a public policy achievement: more than two thirds of participants are credit unions. But it also widens the risk surface, because not every institution has the same anti-fraud capabilities. In instant payments, the weakest link sets the route of the money: fraud looks for the institution with the laxest controls to open accounts or receive funds.
Every newly connected institution is a point of onboarding, key registration and incoming funds that needs equivalent identity controls. Brazil has already shown this: according to Asobancaria, Colombia’s banking association, fraud rose by 56% after the launch of Pix, Brazil’s instant payment system.
The open challenges for year two
The main challenges left by the first year are key activation, interoperability between systems and the concentration in low-value payments.
Registered keys that go unused
Only 45 of every 116 million keys have been used to receive a payment. A dormant key is an asset that someone can hijack or reuse if its owner is not watching it.
The same applies to accounts. An account opened by its legitimate holder can be sold, rented out or taken over months later. Its key still points to a verified identity, even though that person is no longer the one operating it.

Figure 1. Registered keys, keys used to receive a payment and users with at least one key (millions). Source: Banco de la República, 6 October 2026. Prepared by Facephi.
Interoperability between systems is still low
Institutions connect to Bre-B directly or through one of the six immediate low-value payment systems (SPBVI). Payments between systems, where the payer and the payee are connected to different SPBVIs, grew 14-fold during the year but still account for less than 5% of the total. In practice, most transfers still flow within a single system, and the user experience depends on where the payee holds their account.
“The challenge now is to deepen interoperability and strengthen operational resilience.”
Ana María Prieto, Director of the Payment Systems Department at Banco de la República. Source: Banco de la República, 6 October 2026. Own translation.
Concentration in small payments
62% of the year’s transactions were below COP 50,000. The rules cap each transfer at 1,000 UVB, about COP 12.1 million at the 2026 UVB value (COP 12,110). The cap reflects caution while operational capacity and dispute handling mature.
Bre-B is mainly used as a substitute for cash in everyday payments. For fraud, that means low-value, high-frequency scams that fall below manual review thresholds and that many victims do not even report. The cap is still 1,000 UVB today. If it is raised, as proposed in the draft regulation Banco de la República published for comment in October 2026, every compromised account will be worth much more.
Fraud in Bre-B’s first year: what we have learned
Documented fraud that exploits the Bre-B brand centres on manipulating users and on receiving accounts that move money in seconds.
The Bre-B brand as a social engineering hook
Throughout the year, outlets such as Noticias RCN (in Spanish) and Bogotá City Hall warned of three patterns: fake SMS messages and links to “register” keys, fake payment receipts and bank impersonation. In March 2026, Bogotá described an SMS campaign that faked an incoming payment and asked users to confirm the transfer on a fake website that captured passwords and codes.
Registering or changing a key: the new critical identity moment
Whoever controls the key controls where the money lands. That is why registering and changing a key are risk moments as relevant as opening an account. Verifying the person at those points reduces key hijacking, but it is not enough: fraud can strike at any point in the relationship, months after a flawless onboarding.
Point-in-time verification has to be complemented with behavioural, device and account signals throughout the customer lifecycle. Digital onboarding with biometric verification also makes it possible to repeat verification when the risk calls for it, without redoing the whole process.
The role of money mule accounts
A Bre-B transfer settles in seconds and cannot be reversed. That irreversibility speeds up the flow of stolen money towards receiving accounts that disperse it before the victim reports the fraud.
Not all of those accounts are fake. Some are created with synthetic data solely to move money. Others belong to real people who lend or sell them, either deceived or knowingly. In these cases the holder’s identity was properly verified at onboarding, but that does not guarantee the account is used legitimately.
The pattern emerges when you look at the account over time and in relation to others: immediate inflows and outflows of funds, the same devices, the same recipients. We explain the regulatory fit in money mule accounts under the SARLAFT framework (in Spanish).
| Fraud pattern | Exposed identity moment | Response for the institution |
| Fake key registration SMS or link | Key registration and credentials | Verify the holder at registration, not only at onboarding |
| Fake payment receipt | Confirmation of the payment received | Confirmation only inside the app; user education |
| Bank impersonation | Account access and device change | Biometric verification on device change |
| Dispersal through receiving accounts | Account receiving the funds | Monitor the receiving account and its inflow and outflow patterns |
Table 2. Fraud patterns associated with Bre-B and the identity moment they exploit. Source: Noticias RCN and Bogotá City Hall alerts (2026). Prepared by Facephi.
5 lessons for banks, credit unions and fintechs connected to Bre-B
The central lesson of the first year is that identity verification does not end at onboarding: it must adapt to the risk of each moment and ask for more only when the context justifies it.
1. Keep security high without hurting the experience
Bre-B succeeded because it is simple, and security has to respect that simplicity. That means simple onboarding and verification processes that take seconds on a mobile phone, and passive liveness detection that confirms a real person is present without asking for gestures. We explore this in the false dilemma between security and experience in Bre-B (in Spanish).
2. Adapt identity verification to the risk of the session, not just at onboarding
Not every transaction requires the same level of verification. A routine login from the usual device can go through without extra steps. A key registration, a device change or an unusual payment justify asking for a new biometric check. Identity verification (KYC) at onboarding is the starting point, and every later verification adds evidence to the customer’s history.
3. Read signals in real time
With a 20-second window, the decision is made before the payment leaves. Throughout the session, behaviour, device and network make it possible to check that the same person is still operating. If confidence is not enough, the proportionate response is to ask for an additional check rather than block. Behavioural biometrics provide that reading without asking anything of the user.
4. Watch the receiving account too
Most controls focus on the payer. In instant payments, the receiving account is where the fraud chain breaks. Classifying own and counterparty accounts (normal, victim or mule) and requesting identity re-verification when an anomaly appears makes it possible to act before the money is dispersed. Facephi offers money mule detection to identify these patterns.
5. Turn controls into evidence for the supervisor
SARLAFT does not just require having controls; it requires proving them. Every verification, authentication or block must be recorded with its date, result and reason, so it can be explained to the Financial Superintendence of Colombia and in the claims opened under Law 2573. We cover this in SARLAFT as proof for the compliance officer.
Bre-B’s second year: what comes next and why the bar for identity is rising
The second year broadens use cases and payment values, and coincides with two regulatory changes: mandatory Open Finance and Law 2573 against identity theft.
On 2 October 2026, Banco de la República published a draft regulation for comment (in Spanish). It opens the door to business and government payments, value-added services such as e-commerce and request to pay, and innovation in unregulated segments, such as transactions above 1,000 UVB.
| Year-two change | What it means | Identity requirement |
| Payments above 1,000 UVB | More value per transaction | Stronger verification for high-value payments |
| Business and government payments | New players and flows | Identify the company and whoever operates on its behalf |
| E-commerce and request to pay | Payment requests initiated by third parties | Confirm the identity of the requester and the approver |
| Mandatory Open Finance (Decree 0368) | Data shared between institutions | Verifiable consent from the account holder |
| Law 2573 in force (19 Nov 2026) | Special regime for identity theft claims | Traceability of every verification |
Table 3. Changes in Bre-B’s second year and the associated identity requirements. Source: Banco de la República (2 and 6 October 2026), Law 2573 of 2026. Prepared by Facephi.
Meanwhile, Law 2573 against identity theft (in Spanish) comes into force on 19 November 2026 and creates a special regime for claims by identity theft victims. At the same time, mandatory Open Finance under Decree 0368 multiplies the points where customer information is shared. For a deeper dive, the full framework is in our guide to fintech regulation in Colombia in 2026 (in Spanish).
Towards more security without compromising the experience
Bre-B’s first year was a success in adoption and infrastructure. The second year, with higher values, more use cases and new legal obligations, also opens the door wider to fraud: every compromised account will be worth more, and there will be more players through which to move money. Strengthening security without breaking the experience requires verifying identity wherever the risk moves.
Frequently asked questions about Bre-B’s first year
More than 1.7 billion transfers worth over COP 262 trillion between October 2025 and October 2026, according to Banco de la República. On 1 October 2026 it set a record of 10.4 million transactions in a single day.
More than 36 million people hold at least one key. There are 116 million registered keys, of which 45 million have been used to receive at least one payment (Banco de la República, October 2026).
The infrastructure has maintained availability above 99.8%. Fraud associated with Bre-B relies mainly on social engineering: fake key registration messages, fake receipts and bank impersonation.
The rules set a cap of 1,000 UVB per transaction, about COP 12.1 million in 2026. In October 2026, Banco de la República published a draft regulation to allow innovation in unregulated segments, such as payments above that cap.
More use cases (business and government payments, e-commerce, request to pay), more interoperability between systems and alignment with mandatory Open Finance and Law 2573 against identity theft.
Talk to our team and review how your identity controls align with regulatory compliance in Colombia. Request a demo